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Abstract—In this paper a protection placement problem for
power network measurement system data integrity is considered.
The placement problem is motivated from the data secure
power network design applications in [Dan and Sandberg 2010].
The problem is shown to be NP-hard and an integer linear
programming formulation is provided based on the topological
observability condition by [Krumpholz, Clements and Davis
1980]. The incorporation of the observability condition requires
a graph connectivity constraint which is found to be most effec-
tively described by the Miller-Tucker-Zemlin (MTZ) conditions.
For a specialization without line power flow measurements, the
protection placement problem can be modeled by a domination
type integer linear program much easier to solve than the general
formulation requiring graph connectivity. Numerical studies with
IEEE benchmark and other large power systems with more than
2000 buses indicate that using the proposed formulations, the
protection placement problem can be solved in negligible amount
of time in realistic application settings.
Index Terms—Power system state estimation, false data injec-
tion attack, equipment placement, observability, integer linear
programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
State estimation is a crucial functionality in energy manage-
ment system. Data integrity of state estimation is of paramount
importance to other downstream functionalities including op-
timal power flow, unit commitment and contingency analysis.
Customarily bad data detection (BDD) is employed in con-
junction with state estimation to detect and isolate possible
data anomalies and to rectify the data if possible. In traditional
BDD, however, data anomalies are typically treated as random
measurement error or switch status error. This assumption on
anomalies significantly limits the energy management system’s
capabilities to combat malicious data attack on state estima-
tion. For example, references [1]–[7] analyze and quantify the
consequence of a type of malicious data attack called false data
injection attack [1]. Another important data integrity research
direction, which is the focus of this paper, is protection place-
ment. A typical placement objective is to seek a minimum cost
placement of protection resources (e.g., encryption devices,
secure phasor measurement units (PMU)) so that, according
to the considered attack and defense model, no false data
injection attack is possible (e.g., [2], [4], [7]). Because of
the combinatorial feature, it is often deemed acceptable to
only sub-optimally solve the protection placement problem.
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For example, [2], [4], [7] consider various types of heuristic
algorithms aiming to minimize the protection cost. Reference
[6] provides a suboptimal strategy to guard against some given
attack scenarios. The protection placement problem is closely
related to the classical problem of observable measurement
system design in power systems (e.g., [8], [9]). Leveraging the
connection between the protection placement problem and ob-
servable measurement system design problem, this paper seeks
to solve the former problem exactly via integer programming
with the help of the results from the later problem (e.g., [8],
[10]). Unifying the results in [8], [10], this paper formulates a
protection placement optimization problem suitable for appli-
cations with bus power injection, line power flow as well as
PMU measurements. It is shown that the optimization problem
is NP-hard and an integer program formulation of the problem
is provided. A crucial consideration in the formulation is the
modeling of a graph connectivity requirement due to [10],
which significantly affects the computation effort required
to solve the formulation. After extensive investigations it is
concluded that the Miller-Tucker-Zemlin (MTZ) conditions
[11] are best for the purpose herein. The numerical studies
in this paper demonstrate that even for models with more than
2000 buses the MTZ based formulation can be solved, on
average, within a few minutes on a PC. This is acceptable for
power system planning purposes. In addition, for a restricted
setup without line power flow measurements (e.g., only PMUs
and zero injection buses as in [8]) it is established that a
streamlined integer linear programming formulation originally
appears in [8] is indeed correct for the protection placement
problem (as well as the problem in [8]). To the best of
our knowledge, the proof of correctness of the formulation
from [8] appears for the first time in this paper. Further, by
analyzing the structure of the proposed integer programming
formulations, we discover that certain binary decision variables
can be relaxed to continuous-valued without changing the
optimization outcome. Some computation consequences of this
discovery are discussed in this paper.
Outline: Section II describes the protection placement
problem called perfect protection problem. It is established
that the perfect protection problem can be described as an
optimization problem with a graph connectivity constraint. In
Section III the perfect protection problem is formulated as a
linear integer program with MTZ connectivity constraints. It
is also demonstrated that certain binary decision variables can
be relaxed to continuous-valued. In Section IV a special setup
without line power flow measurement is considered. It is estab-
lished that the linear integer program derived in Section III can
be specialized to the formulation originally appeared in [8].
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2Section V describes numerical studies for solving the proposed
formulations for realistically-sized examples including the
IEEE power system benchmarks. The studies demonstrate the
superiority of the proposed formulations.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A power network is modeled as an undirected connected
graph where the nodes are buses, and the edges are trans-
mission (distribution) lines. The set of all buses (nodes) is
denoted V and the set of lines (edges) is denoted E. An edge
is defined by an unordered pair {i, j} where i, j ∈ V are
the two end nodes of the edge. The power network graph is
denoted (V,E). The symbols |V | and |E| denote the number of
buses and the number of lines, respectively. Following [2], [4],
[6], [7], this paper considers the DC power flow measurement
model [12] for state estimation. In this model, the states to
be estimated are the bus voltage phasors. The measurements
include bus real power injections, line real power flows and
phasors measured directly from relevant PMUs. In this paper,
a PMU measures the phasor at the installed bus as well as
those at all neighboring buses. Let z and θ denote the vectors
of measurements and states respectively. Then, DC power flow
model specifies z = Hθ + ∆z, where H is the measurement
matrix and ∆z denotes measurement imperfection. In this
paper, ∆z is the vector of data attacks on measurements.
In state estimation, BDD attempts to detect possible data at-
tack in the measurements (i.e., ∆z). In a typical residual-based
BDD scheme, the measurement residual r and the data attack
∆z are related by r = (I − H(HTR−1H)−1HTR−1)∆z
where R is a given diagonal positive definite matrix. The
relation specifies that r is the projection of ∆z on the left
null space of H . In other words, if ∆z = Hθ˜ for some θ˜
then r = 0, resulting in detection evasion. Malicious attack
of this form is referred to as false data injection attack [1].
As a countermeasure, [2], [4], [6], [7] consider the notion of
perfect protection where selected measurements or PMUs are
protected to prevent false data injection attacks. The protection
rule is as follows: injection and line power flow measure-
ments can be protected individually: protecting measurement
zi means ∆zi = 0. However, protection rule for PMU is
different: suppose a PMU is associated with measurements
zj with j ∈ J for some row index set of H . Protecting the
PMU means ∆zj = 0 for all j ∈ J . Arranging the protected
measurements first, a false data injection attack is of the form
∆z =
[
0
∆zp¯
]
= Hθ˜ =
[
Hp
Hp¯
]
θ˜, for some θ˜, (1)
where Hp and Hp¯ are the submatrices of H corresponding to
the protected and unprotected measurements respectively. In
(1) Hpθ˜ = 0 is due to protection directly. To ensure perfect
protection (i.e., ∆z = 0), it is required that
for any θ˜, Hpθ˜ = 0 =⇒ ∆zp¯ = Hp¯θ˜ = 0. (2)
Condition (2) is equivalent to the fact that the null space of Hp
is a subspace of the null space of Hp¯. However, neither this
condition or (2) is convenient to impose in an optimization
problem (for protection placement). Furthermore, a perfect
protection condition dependent on the unprotected measure-
ments (i.e., Hp¯) is undesirable because the constitution of the
unprotected measurements may change during operations. This
might result in loss of perfect protection. Consequently, in
references including [4], [7] the following sufficient condition
for perfect protection is considered
Hpθ˜ = 0 =⇒ θ˜ = 0, i.e., Hp has full column rank. (3)
Condition (3) is algebraic observability condition [10] for
the reduced measurement system utilizing only the protected
measurements characterized by (the rows of) Hp. However,
the algebraic observability condition is sensitive to the values
of line impedance parameters. Thus, instead of (3) this pa-
per considers the topological observability condition [10] to
guarantee perfect protection. Generically, matrix Hp in (3) is
Hp =
MIADATMLDAT
MP
 , (4)
where A ∈ R|V |×|E| is the (signed) incidence matrix describ-
ing the topology of the power network. The directions of the
directed arcs in A are designated arbitrarily. Matrix D ∈ R|E|2
is diagonal with nonzero entries being the reciprocals of the
line reactances. MI , ML and MP are submatrices containing
rows of identity matrices of appropriate dimensions, in order
to select the protected measurements for injection, line power
flows and PMU respectively. Then, condition (3) amounts to
Hp in (4) having full column rank, for a specific D. On the
other hand, the topological observability condition considered
in this paper requires that
Hp(D˜) :=
MIAD˜ATMLD˜AT
MP
 has full column rank (= |V |),
for almost all diagonal D˜.
(5)
Condition (5) depends on the topology of the power system
graph (V,E) and the locations of the protected measurements.
However, it is independent of line parameters. Additionally, it
can be shown that (5) is equivalent to a graph connectivity
condition specified by the following statement:
Proposition 2.1: Let G = (V,E) be a (power network)
graph such that V = {v1, v2, . . . , v|V |}. Let A ∈ R|V |×|E| be
the (signed) incidence matrix of G with arc direction arbitrarily
designated. Let I ⊆ V , L ⊆ E and P ⊆ V be given (i.e., sets
of protected injections, line power flows and PMU phasors
respectively). Define the following objects:
• MI is a submatrix of a |V |× |V | identity matrix contain-
ing the rows corresponding to I .
• ML is a submatrix of a |E| × |E| identity matrix con-
taining the rows corresponding to L.
• MP is a submatrix of a |V | × |V | identity matrix con-
taining the rows corresponding to P .
• EP0 := {{i, 0} | i ∈ P}.
Then, condition (5) holds if and only if there exists a function
g : I 7→ E, with constraint that i ∈ g(i) for all i ∈ I , such
that the graph (V ∪ {0}, L ∪ EP0 ∪ g(I)) is connected, with
g(I) := {g(i) | i ∈ I}.
3Proof: For any θ˜, in (5) Hp(D˜)θ˜ = 0 if and only ifMIAD˜AT+MIMTPMP −MIMTPMP1MLD˜AT 0
MP −MP1
[ θ˜
θ0
]
= 0, θ0 = 0,
(6)
where 1 is column vector of ones of commensurate dimension.
Intuitively, (MIAD˜AT+MIMTPMP )θ˜−MIMTPMP1θ0 is the
vector of injections at I in an augmented graph, denoted Ga,
with an additional node 0 and additional edges in EP0. The
equation in (6) can be rewritten as
H¯p
[
θ˜
θ0
]
:=
[
M¯IA¯D¯A¯
T
M¯LD¯A¯
T
] [
θ˜
θ0
]
= 0, θ0 = 0 (7)
where A¯, D¯, M¯I and M¯L are the analogies in Ga for A, D,
MI and ML in G. In particular,
A¯ =
[
A MTP
0 −1TMTP
]
, D¯ =
[
D˜ 0
0 I
]
, M¯I =
[
MI 0
]
,
M¯L =
[
ML 0
0 I
]
.
(8)
As a result,
(5) ⇐⇒ Hp(D˜)θ˜ = 0 =⇒ θ˜ = 0, almost all diag D˜
⇐⇒ (7) =⇒ θ˜ = 0, almost all diag D˜
Due to (8), H¯p in (7) can be interpreted as the measurement
matrix of a power system corresponding to Ga with injection
measurements in I and line power flow measurements in L∪
EP0. However, Ga does not have any PMU measurement.
With this interpretation, the condition that (7) =⇒ θ˜ = 0 for
almost all D˜ is topological observability of the measurement
system described with I and L ∪ EP0 for Ga. According to
[10], this condition is equivalent to the existence of a function
g : I 7→ E, with constraint that i ∈ g(i) for all i ∈ I , such
that the graph (V ∪ {0}, L ∪ EP0 ∪ g(I)) is connected.
Note that since AT1 = 0 and node 0 can only be connected
through EP0, the two equivalent conditions established in
Proposition 2.1 both requires P 6= ∅ (i.e., at least one protected
PMU). However, Proposition 2.1 does not assume connectivity
of the original power network graph (V,E), though connectiv-
ity typically holds in practice. In the situation without PMU,
condition (3) should be modified so that the null space of Hp
is the span of 1. The topological observability condition in
[10] can be utilized directly to describe the modified condition
without Proposition 2.1.
The protection placement problem in this paper seeks
a minimum cost protection placement to guarantee perfect
protection in the sense of (5). The protection decisions are
described by 0-1 binary decision variables xi for i ∈ V , yj for
j ∈ E and zk for k ∈ V for bus power injections, line power
flows and PMU respectively. By convention, xi = 1 if and only
if the injection at bus i is protected. Analogous conventions
apply to the yj and zk decision variables. In addition, let
MI ⊆ V , ML ⊆ E and MP ⊆ V denote the set of buses
with measured injections, the set of lines with measured power
flows and the set of buses with PMU installed, respectively.
Then, by convention xi = 0 if i /∈ MI . Similarly, yj = 0 if
j /∈ ML and zk = 0 if k /∈ MP . Let cIi , cLj and cPk denote
the protection costs associated with xi, yj and zk respectively.
If bus v is a zero-injection bus the corresponding protection
cost is cIv = 0. Then, the objective of the protection placement
problem is to minimize
∑
i∈MI
cIi xi +
∑
j∈ML
cLj yj +
∑
k∈MP
cPk zk. (9)
Let I(x) = {i ∈ V | xi = 1}, L(y) = {e ∈ E | ye = 1} and
P (z) = {i ∈ V | zi = 1 or ∃k ∈ V : zk = 1, {i, k} ∈ E} be
the set of buses with power injection measurement protected,
the set of lines with power flow measurement protected and the
set of buses whose phasors are measured by protected PMU
respectively. Recall EP0(z) := {{i, 0} | i ∈ P (z)}. Then, by
Proposition 2.1 the perfect protection constraint is
there exists g : I(x) 7→ E with i ∈ g(i) for all i ∈ I(x)
s.t. (V ∪ {0}, L(y) ∪ EP0(z) ∪ g(I(x))) is connected.
(10)
In sequel, (9) and (10) together are referred to as the perfect
protection problem. The perfect protection problem is NP-
hard. This can be established by considering the special case
with a PMU at each bus but nothing else (i.e., MI = ∅,
ML = ∅,MP = V ). This special case reduces to a minimum
dominating set problem which is NP-hard (e.g., [13]).
III. INTEGER PROGRAMMING FORMULATION OF PERFECT
PROTECTION PROBLEM
To model (9) and (10) as an integer program it is necessary
to describe the connectivity requirement in (10) as linear
constraints with respect to the decision variables. Intuitively,
(10) is equivalent to the existence of a rooted spanning
tree using edges in L(y) ∪ EP0(z) ∪ g(I(x))). First, for an
arbitrary graph (V¯ , E¯) the conditions for existence of a rooted
spanning tree are described. Second, additional requirements
are described specifying that the spanning tree can be formed
using only edges in L(y) ∪ EP0(z) ∪ g(I(x))), making the
spanning tree conditions relevant to (10).
For existence of spanning tree well-known conditions in-
clude, for example, Miller-Tucker-Zemlin (MTZ) conditions
[14], subtour elimination (e.g., [15]), Martin’s conditions [16],
single commodity flow (e.g., [17], [18]) and multi-commodity
flow (e.g., [19]). After computation studies conducted in
conjunction with this work (not shown in this paper), a variant
of MTZ conditions [11] is adopted. The detail is as follows.
Let (V¯ , E¯) be given and V¯ includes some “reference” node 0.
Let A¯ be the bi-directed version of E¯ (i.e., A¯ := {(i, j), (j, i) |
{i, j} ∈ E¯}). Let fij ∈ {0, 1} for (i, j) ∈ A¯ be 0-1 binary
decision variables (to describe the spanning tree). In addition,
define integer decision variables ui ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |V¯ | − 1} for
i ∈ V¯ (the u variables can be relaxed to real numbers between
0 and |V¯ |−1 [20]). Then, according to [11] the graph (V¯ , E¯)
4contains a (directed) spanning tree if and only if there admits
f and u satisfying the following constraints
(|V¯ |−1)fij+(|V¯ |−3)fji+ui−uj ≤ (|V¯ |−2), ∀(i, j) ∈ A¯
(11a)
0 ≤ ui ≤ |V¯ | − 1, ∀i ∈ V¯ (11b)∑
j:(i,j)∈A¯
fij = 1, ∀i ∈ V¯ \ {0} (11c)∑
j:(j,0)∈A¯
fj0 ≥ 1 (11d)∑
(i,j)∈A¯
fij = |V¯ | − 1 (11e)
The directed spanning tree, if exists, is characterized by f (i.e.,
fij = 1 if and only if arc (i, j), from i to j, is included). The
constraints (11a) to (11e) impose restrictions in the choice of
f (and u). Constrants (11a) and (11b) together are referred
to as subtour elimination constraints. They prevent directed
cycles with less than |V¯ | arcs. Constraint (11c) specifies that
for each node other than 0 exactly one outgoing arc is included
in f . Constraint (11d) specifies that for node 0 at least one
incoming arc is included in f . Node 0 is the in-root of the
spanning tree. Constraint (11e) requires that f contains |V¯ |
arcs. It can be verified that f corresponding to any directed
spanning tree rooted at node 0 satisfies all constraints in (11a)
to (11e), with some appropriate choice of u. Conversely, f
(together with u) satisfying constraints (11a) to (11d) means
that from each node other than node 0 there exists a directed
path to node 0. Hence, f characterizes a connected graph
containing all nodes. Constraint (11e) states that the connected
graph contains exactly |V¯ | − 1 arcs which implies that it is
a tree (cf. [21]). In conclusion, constraints (11a) to (11e) are
necessary and sufficient for existence of (directed) spanning
tree in (V¯ , E¯) (or equivalently the connectedness of (V¯ , E¯)).
Next, we specialize conditions (11a) to (11e) to V¯ = V ∪{0}
and E¯ = E ∪ {{i, 0} | i ∈ V }. In addition, we impose the
conditions that fij is enabled (i.e., allowed to be one) if and
only if {i, j} ∈ L(y) ∪ EP0(z) ∪ g(I(x))) for some function
g in (10). An edge of the form {i, 0} for i ∈ V can only be
enabled by EP0(z). Recall that PMU at bus i is protected if
and only if zi = 1. Therefore,
f0i + fi0 ≤ zi +
∑
j:{i,j}∈E
zj , ∀i ∈ V. (12)
On the other hand, an edge e ∈ E is enabled either because
e ∈ L(y) (i.e., protected line) or e ∈ g(I(x)) (i.e., assignment
from protected injection):
fij + fji ≤ y{i,j} + w{i,j}i + w{i,j}j , ∀{i, j} ∈ E, (13)
where wei for e ∈ E, i ∈ V are 0-1 binary decision variables
describing the assignment g(I(x)) in (10). The convention is
that wei = 1 if and only if g(i) = e. Because of the fact that g
is a function, as well as other requirements in (10), additional
constraints should be imposed on w:
wei = 0, i /∈ e, and
∑
e∈E
wei ≤ xi, ∀i ∈ V. (14)
This concludes modeling (10) as linear constraints. The integer
program describing the perfect protection problem is summa-
rized as
minimize
x,y,z,w,f,u
cost in (9)
subject to constraints (11a) to (14)
xi = 0, ∀i /∈MI , xi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈MI
yj = 0, ∀j /∈ML, yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ML
zk = 0, ∀k /∈MP , zk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈MP
wei ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(e, i) ∈ E × V,
fij , fji ∈ {0, 1}, ∀{i, j} ∈ E ∪ {{k, 0}|k ∈ V }
ui ∈ {0, . . . , |V |}, ∀i ∈ {0} ∪ V
(15)
In constraints (11a) to (11e) in problem (15) the convention
is that V¯ = V ∪ {0} and A¯ = {(i, j), (j, i) | {i, j} ∈ E¯} with
E¯ = E ∪ {{i, 0} | i ∈ V }.
Some of the integer variables in (15) can be relaxed to
continuous variables. As noted in [20], the u variables can
be continuous, between 0 and |V |. In addition, the coefficient
matrices multiplying the x variables and y variables are
submatrices of identity. By a total unimodularity argument
(e.g., [22]) it is seen that x and y can be relaxed to continuous
variables between 0 and 1. Furthermore, the w variables appear
only in constraints (13) and (14). With respect to w these
are constraints describing an assignment problem (e.g., [22]).
Thus, the w variables can also be relaxed to continuous ones
between 0 and 1. In summary, the integer program in (15) is
equivalent to the following mixed integer linear program
minimize
x,y,z,w,f,u
cost in (9)
subject to constraints (11a) to (14)
xi = 0, ∀i /∈MI , 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈MI
yj = 0, ∀j /∈ML, 0 ≤ yj ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ML
zk = 0, ∀k /∈MP , zk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈MP
0 ≤ wei ≤ 1, ∀(e, i) ∈ E × V,
fij , fji ∈ {0, 1}, ∀{i, j} ∈ E ∪ {{k, 0}|k ∈ V }
0 ≤ ui ≤ |V |, ∀i ∈ {0} ∪ V
(16)
IV. DOMINATION SPECIALIZATION OF PERFECT
PROTECTION PROBLEM
While (15) describes the perfect protection problem in
general, more streamlined (hence less computationally de-
manding) formulations are available if restrictions are imposed
on the available measurement types (characterized by MI ,
ML andMP ). An example mentioned earlier is thatMI = ∅,
ML = ∅ and MP = V . In this case, problem (15) is
a minimum dominating set problem which requires fewer
constraints to model and less time solve. It turns out a
more general case with ML = ∅ also admits streamlined
formulation as a domination-type problem without requiring
graph connectivity. This is specified by the following statement
5Proposition 4.1: Let graph (V,E) be given with V =
{v1, . . . , v|V |}. Let I ⊆ V and P ⊆ V be given (i.e., sets of
protected injections and protected PMU phasors respectively).
Consider the following two conditions:
(a) there exists g : I 7→ E such that i ∈ g(i) and the graph
(V ∪{0}, g(I)∪EP0) is connected, with EP0 = {{i, 0} |
i ∈ P},
(b) there exists h : I 7→ V satisfying two requirements: (i)
h(i) = i or {i, h(i)} ∈ E and (ii) P ∪ h(I) = V .
Then, if (a) holds then (b) holds. Conversely, if (V,E) is
connected, P 6= ∅ and (b) holds then (a) holds.
Proof: Suppose (a) holds. Connectivity of graph (V ∪
{0}, g(I) ∪ EP0) implies that there exists a spanning tree
rooted in node 0. Let T denote the tree. We will show that T
can be used to define an node-to-node assignment function h
so that (b) holds. Initialize h(v) := ∅ for all v ∈ I . Consider a
reverse level order traversal of T and then truncate the traversal
by removing all leaves of T and node 0. Let i1, i2, . . . , im be
the resulted truncation. Consider inspecting i = i1, i2, . . . , im
one-at-a-time. For any node i inspected, let C(i) ⊆ V be the
set of children of i in T (C(i) 6= ∅ since i is not a leaf).
The nodes in {i} ∪ C(i) induce a subgraph of T with |C(i)|
edges of the form {i, j} for j ∈ C(i). Since i 6= 0, (a) in the
statement implies that these edges must be in g({i}∪C(i)). In
addition, for each j ∈ C(i) either (I) j ∈ I and g(j) = {i, j}
or (II) j /∈ I or g(j) 6= {i, j} (then i ∈ I and g(i) = {i, j}).
For case (I), update h(j) := j. For case (II), update h(i) := j.
This finishes the inspection for node i. The process is repeated
for all nodes in the truncated tree traversal. We will prove the
following three claims: (A) for all v ∈ I , h(v) is updated at
most once, (B) for all v ∈ I , either h(v) = v or {v, h(v)} ∈ E
and (C) for all u ∈ V \ P , there exists some iu ∈ I such that
h(iu) = u. Claim (A) is due to the update rule of h: updating
h(v) := w for some w ∈ V means that g(v) = {v, w}.
By (a), g(v) corresponds to only one edge. In addition, the
edge {v, w} is considered exactly once during the inspection
process. Claim (B) is a direct consequence of the update rule
for h. To see claim (C), note that when u is considered (when
its parent is inspected), iu is identified and the corresponding
h(iu) is updated to u. By claim (A), assignment h(iu) = u will
not be modified again during subsequent inspections. Hence,
claim (C) holds. Claims (B) and (C) together imply that h
satisfies (i) and (ii) of (b) in the statement. This shows that
(a) implies (b).
Suppose (b) holds, (V,E) is connected and P 6= ∅.
To show (a) we will show that it is possible to construct
a node-to-edge assignment function g such that the graph
(V ∪ {0}, g(I) ∪EP0) in (a) contains a path from any i ∈ V
to node 0. Initialize R0 := P ∪ {0} (the set of nodes
“reaching” node 0 and g(v) := ∅ for all v ∈ I . Next, consider
i /∈ R0 ⊇ P , if any. By (b), there exists some j ∈ I such that
{i, j} ∈ E and h(j) = i. However, j need not be unique.
Pick an arbitrary j and denote j := h−1(i). If j ∈ R0
update g(j) := {i, j} and update R0 ← R0 ∪ {i}. This is
motivated by the fact that now a path exists from i to R0
(and hence to node 0), with edges in g(I) ∪ EP0 . On the
other hand, if j /∈ R0 then again by (b) there exists some
k ∈ I such that {j, k} ∈ E and k = h−1(j) := h−2(i).
Continue to identify h−3(i), . . .. Since graph (V,E) is finite, at
some point this process must stop because of two possibilities
(P1): h−d(i) ∈ R0 for some d ∈ Z or (P2): h−d(i) = i for
some d. Note that the following variant of (P2) is impossible:
h−d(i) = h−s(i) = v 6= i for some s ≥ 1. In this case,
h(v) would have two different values, violating (b) in the
statement. For possibility (P1), denote h0(i) = i and update
g(h−`(i)) := {h−`+1(i), h−`(i)} for ` = 1, . . . , d. Update
also R0 ← R0 ∪ {i, h−1(i), . . . , h−d+1(i)}. By updating
g, the nodes i, h−1(i), . . . , h−d+1(i) become connected to
h−d(i) ∈ R0 with edges in g(I) ∪ EP0 and hence they are
included in R0. On the other hand, possibility (P2) means that
i, h−1(i), . . . , h−d(i) = i form a cycle with every node in
I . This concludes the process with i /∈ R0. Next, find another
node not in (the most updated) R0 or the cycle(s) identified
so far, and repeat the same process of updating g and R0
until V is partitioned into R0 and possibly a finite number of
cycles. The assumption P 6= ∅ implies R0 6= ∅. In addition,
connectivity of (V,E) implies that, if cycles exist, at least one
is adjacent to R0 in the sense that there exist node u ∈ R0
and node v in the cycle such that {u, v} ∈ E. Suppose the
cycle is v = h0(v), h−1(v), . . . , h−d(v) = v. Then update
g(h−`(v)) := {h−`(v), h−`+1(v)} for ` = 1, . . . , d − 1 and
g(h−d(v)) := {u, v}. Update R0 to include all the nodes in the
cycle and continue with the next cycle adjacent to the updated
R0 until R0 = V ∪{0} (otherwise adjacent cycle must exist).
We will prove the following three claims: (D) for all v ∈ I ,
g(v) is updated at most once, (E) for all v ∈ I , v ∈ g(v)
and (F) while R0 and g are being updated, at any moment
(R0, g(I)∪EP0) is connected. To see claim (D), if v is to be
included in R0 then g(v) is updated for the first time because
a node is included in R0 at most once. Only in possibility
(P1) can v be already in R0 while g(v) is being updated.
However, for (P1) g(v) := {v, u} for some u implies u is to
be included in R0 and h(v) = u. If g(v) is updated more than
once, for example, as g(v) := {v, u} and g(v) := {v, w}, then
u 6= w (since a node is included in R0 at most once) and h(v)
would be valued u and w simultaneously. This violates (b).
Thus, claim (D) is true. Claim (E) is a direct consequence of
the update rule for g. For claim (F), note that initially when
R0 = P ∪ {0}, graph (R0, g(I) ∪EP0) is connected because
of EP0. When some i, h−1(i), . . . , h−d(i) is included in R0,
these nodes are connected to R0 through edges g(h−`(i)) for
` = 1, . . . , d. In addition, by claim (D) the values of g(h−`(i))
for ` = 1, . . . , d will not change in subsequent updates of g.
Hence, claim (F) is true. Since R0 = V ∪{0} at the end, claims
(E) and (F) imply that g satisfies condition (a) in the statement.
In conclusion, assuming P 6= ∅ and (V,E) connected, (b)
implies (a) in the statement.
Since it is impossible to satisfy (a) in Proposition 4.1 if
P = ∅, the perfect protection problem can be augmented
with the constraint P 6= ∅. In addition, assume that (V,E) is
connected (connectivity can be checked in polynomial time).
Then, conditions (a) and (b) in Proposition 4.1 are equivalent.
Thus, (b) provides an alternative formulation of the perfect
protect problem in the case with no line power flows (i.e.,
ML = ∅). The protection decisions are encoded by 0-1 binary
variables x and z, for injections and PMUs respectively, as in
6(9) and (10). The sets I(x) and P (z) are defined similarly. In
condition (b), I = I(x) and P = P (z). To describe function
h, define 0-1 binary decision variables wij for i, j ∈ V
such that wij = 1 if and only if h(j) = i. The conditions
P (z) ∪ h(I(x)) = V and h(i) = i or {i, h(i)} ∈ E require
zi +
∑
k:{i,k}∈E
zk +
∑
j∈V
wij ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ V. (17)
as well as∑
i∈V
wij ≤ xj , ∀j ∈ V, wij = 0, ∀i 6= j : {i, j} /∈ E.
(18)
While constraint P 6= ∅ is a natural consequence of (a) in
Proposition 4.1 (i.e., (10)), it needs to be explicitly imposed
while formulating with (b) in Proposition 4.1:∑
k∈MP
zk ≥ 1. (19)
Then, the following integer program is equivalent to problem
(9) and (10) when MP = ∅ and (V,E) is connected:
minimize
x,z,w
∑
i∈MI
cIi xi +
∑
k∈MP
cPk zk
subject to constraints (17), (18) and (19)
xi = 0, ∀i /∈MI , xi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈MI
zk = 0, ∀k /∈MP , zk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈MP
wij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, j ∈ V
.
(20)
Constraint (17) requires that each node is dominated by at
least a protected PMU or a protected injection (subject to as-
signment rule), motivating the term “domination” for problem
(20). Empirically, the graph connectivity requirement in (15) is
much more difficult to handle than the domination requirement
in (20). The difference in computation performances will be
demonstrated in Section V. Note that by the same argument
from problem (15) to (16), the x and w variables in (20) can
be relaxed to continuous variables between 0 and 1 resulting
in the following equivalent mixed integer linear program
minimize
x,z,w
∑
i∈MI
cIi xi +
∑
k∈MP
cPk zk
subject to constraints (17), (18) and (19)
xi = 0, ∀i /∈MI , 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈MI
zk = 0, ∀k /∈MP , zk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈MP
0 ≤ wij ≤ 1, ∀i, j ∈ V
.
(21)
In [8] problem (20) is used to model a PMU placement
problem equivalent to (9) and (10). However, no proof is
provided in [8] to justify the use. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the first in the literature to establish that (20)
indeed models the perfect protection problem (as well as the
one in [8]), under the relevant assumptions discussed earlier.
One might conjecture that the following extension of (20)
may model the perfect protection problem in general. In
addition to domination due to nodes with protected PMU or
protected injection, a function f : E 7→ V such that f(e) ∈ e
can assign an edge with protected line power flow to one of
its end nodes to let it dominated. However, the conjecture is
not true. See Fig. 1 for a counterexample.
bus 1 bus 2
PMU
bus 3 bus 4
Fig. 1: All three measurements/device are protected but perfect
protection is not achieved. The line power flow and injection
are in fact the same measurement, and hence (5) cannot be
satisfied. However, per the conjecture every node is dominated
(e.g., 1, 2 by PMU, 3 by line power flow and 4 by injection).
V. NUMERICAL STUDIES
To illustrate the perfect protection layout and the computa-
tion experience with the proposed formulations, instances of
problems (15), (16), (20) and (21) are solved in this section.
All optimization problems are solved using Gurobi [23] in
MATLAB and the computations are performed on a PC with
14 CPU cores at 2GHz with 128GB of RAM. The power
network graphs describing the instances are from the IEEE
power system benchmark database [24]. First the IEEE 9-
bus system is considered. In this example, all bus injections,
line power flows and the PMUs at all buses are eligible for
protection. The protection costs for all injections and line flows
are one except at the three zero-injection buses (i.e., 4, 6, 8)
the injection protection cost is zero. On the other hand, the
PMU protection cost is one for all buses. The protection costs
are specified so that at optimality only the injections at the
three zero-injection buses and the PMUs would be candidates
for protection. Because of Proposition 4.1 and the choice of
protection costs, the perfect protection problem in this example
is equivalent to the minimum cost PMU placement problem
in [8]. Two formulations in (15) and (20) are solved for the
perfect protection problem in this example. Note that (20) is
applicable since the line power flows will never be protected
at optimality. Both cases lead to the same result: protecting the
PMUs at bus 4 and bus 7 with the total protection cost being
two. This is the same cost for the same example in [8], though
the result therein is to “protect” the PMUs at bus 5 and bus 8.
It can be verified that, with identity D˜, matrix Hp(D˜) in (5)
has full column rank with protected PMUs at bus 4 and bus 7
(with three zero-injection buses at 4, 6 and 8). Fig. 2 shows the
optimal protection layout and verifies that constraint (10) (i.e.,
the only constraint of perfect protection problem) is satisfied.
Fig. 3 shows how condition (b) in Proposition 4.1 is satisfied
by the optimal protection layout due to solving (20).
The remaining study is divided into two parts referred to
as (i) the full measurement case and (ii) the no line power
flow case pertaining Section III and Section IV respectively.
In the full measurement case, all bus injections and line power
flows are measured. In addition, each bus is equipped with a
PMU and 10% of the buses are zero-injection buses. That is,
7G
G
G
bus 1 bus 4 bus 5
bus 9 bus 6 bus 3
bus 2 bus 8 bus 7
PMU
PMU
bus 0
Fig. 2: Minimum cost perfect protection layout of the IEEE
9 bus example, in which the PMUs at bus 4 and bus 7 are
protected. The result is obtained by solving problem (15).
In the figure, the two dash blue boxes indicate the “zones”
covered by the protected PMUs at bus 4 and bus 7 respectively.
The two zones enable direct connections to the “reference” bus
0 through the thick red lines for buses 1, 4, 5, 9, 6, 7 and 8.
In addition, buses 4, 6 and 8 are zero-injection buses whose
injections are known to be zero (i.e., protected automatically).
These injections can help to satisfy (10) in the form of g(I)
(i.e., being assigned to an incident line). For example, the
protected zero-injection at bus 6 is assigned to line {3, 6}
(thick red) and the one at bus 8 is assigned to line {2, 8}
(thick red). In summary, constraint (10) is satisfied by the red
thick lines being the edges in EP0(z) ∪ g(I(x)).
G
G
G
bus 1 bus 4 bus 5
bus 9 bus 6 bus 3
bus 2 bus 8 bus 7
PMU
PMU
Fig. 3: Minimum cost perfect protection layout of the IEEE
9 bus example, in which the PMUs at bus 4 and bus 7 are
protected. The result is obtained by solving problem (20). In
the figure, the blue and red dash boxes indicate the “zones”
dominated by protected PMUs at bus 4 and bus 7 respectively,
in the sense that the buses in the zones are in set P as in (b) of
Proposition 4.1. In addition, the two zero-injection buses can
be ”assigned” through function h in (b) of Proposition 4.1 to
dominate the two buses not in any zone (i.e., buses 2 and 3).
MI = V , ML = E and MP = V and there exists Z ⊆ V
such that cIi = 0 for i ∈ Z and |Z| ≈ 0.1|V |. The injection
protection cost cIi for i ∈MI \Z and the line protection cost
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Fig. 4: Average time (over 100 samples) for solving (15) (i.e.,
integer program) and (16) (i.e., mixed integer program) for
IEEE power system benchmarks of various numbers of buses:
9, 14, 24, 30, 39, 57, 118, 300, 2383 and 2736.
cLj for line j ∈ ML are random integers uniformly sampled
between 1 and 100. The PMU protection cost cPk for bus
k ∈ MP is 80% of the sum of the line protection costs of
all incident lines, rounded up to the next integer. The setup
for the no line power flow case is similar except that the line
power flow measurements are not protected (i.e., ML = ∅).
For the full measurement case, for each power system in
database [24], 100 instances of the general perfect protection
problem are generated and the corresponding integer program
in (15) and mixed integer program in (16) are solved. For
all instances, solving the two formulations results in the same
(optimal) protection cost. In addition, the protection layouts
are verified to provide perfect protection as specified by (5),
for some randomly chosen D˜. For each power system, the
average computation time (over 100 samples) for solving (15)
and (16) is shown in Fig. 4. All instances, including 2383
bus and 2736 bus cases, can be solved within two minutes on
average in the experiment. Further, it is noted that for larger
systems the mixed integer formulation (16) in fact requires
more time to solve than the pure integer formulation (15).
However, for smaller systems the opposite is true. This is
illustrated in Table I.
TABLE I: Average computation time (sec) for solving integer
program in (15) and mixed integer program in (16)
|V | 9 14 30 57 118 300
integer (15) 0.0105 0.0215 0.0426 0.1182 0.3534 1.2446
mixed (16) 0.0105 0.0224 0.0419 0.1122 0.3433 1.1143
For the no line power flow case 100 random instances of
the perfect protection problems are generated for each power
system, and these instances are solved as the corresponding
domination formulations in (20) for the pure integer version
and (21) for the mixed integer version. In addition, the general
formulation in (15) is solved for comparison. For all instances,
all three formulations result in the same (optimal) protection
cost. The average computation times (over 100 samples) for
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Fig. 5: Average time (over 100 samples) for solving (20) (i.e.,
domination integer program), (21) (i.e., domination mixed
integer program) and (15) (i.e., general formulation) for IEEE
power system benchmarks of various numbers of buses: 9, 14,
24, 30, 39, 57, 118, 300, 2383 and 2736.
instances of various numbers of buses are shown in Fig. 5. The
results indicate that the streamlined domination formulations
in (20) and (21) (applicable only in the no line power flow
case) require only a fraction of the time required by the general
formulation in (15). Further, up to the 300 bus case on average
it takes less time to solve the mixed integer formulation in (21)
(not shown in detail). However, for larger instances the purely
integer formulation in (20) requires less time to solve.
VI. CONCLUSION
Extending the result in [10], it is possible to model as
integer program with graph connectivity constraints the perfect
protection (or observable measurement placement) problem
including power injections, line power flows as well as PMUs.
The MTZ constraints modeling graph connectivity are found to
be superior for computation efficiency. Even for instances with
more than 2000 buses optimal placement can be found within
a few minutes on a PC. This agrees with the computation
findings in [19] for variants of the dominating set problem.
For the case without line power flow measurements the
perfect protection problem can be reduced into a domination
type integer program, which further improves computation
efficiency. As a byproduct, the result in this paper proves the
correctness of the formulation in [8]. Also, the studied integer
programs contain certain binary variables that can be relaxed
to continuous variables. However, the computation advantage
of the relaxations has not been strongly established by the
studies conducted in this paper. A further investigation in this
issue could be beneficial. In addition, extension of the results
in this paper to general N − k contingency cases could open
up more application opportunities in the future.
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